Economists study various problems referred to as "market failure" -situations that, at least potentially, justify government intervention to solve them. Externalities (or "social costs") are viewed as perhaps the greatest market failure problems. The externality issue has also occasioned much re-thinking of fundamental economic principles, particularly in the context of Ronald Coase's article on "The Problem of Social Cost." Coase explained that externalities manifested a more fundamental issue in economics, the costs of transacting over rights to affect other's welfare. Following Coase's work, economists almost reflexively consider social costs problematic only when transaction costs are relatively high. Yet, Coase's analysis has resulted in much confusion, even disagreement. For example, Harold Demsetz has recently objected to aspects of the Coase approach, as a matter of both economics and of government policy. As economics, Demsetz says, Coase's focus on transactions costs is not helpful in resolving questions concerning externalities. Even if transaction costs were zero, externalities would still exist. Moreover, Demsetz objects that focus on transaction costs to explain persistent externalities furnishes spurious reasons for undesirable government intervention in markets. This paper summarizes and evaluates Demsetz objections, maintaining that Demsetz sometimes ignores points that Coase has made. At the same time, Demsetz adds new insights to the Coase Theorem. 
I. Introduction
Economists, trained in the study of markets, learn early of various problems grouped under the heading of "market failure" --situations that, at least potentially, justify government intervention to solve them. Cartels and monopolies, for example, are thought by many to require government antitrust action; optimal production of public goods like national defense or national highways likewise are frequently said to necessitate government intervention in otherwise private markets.
Almost certainly, however, externalities (or "social costs") are perceived as the greatest market failure problems. 1 Harold Demsetz recently described by example the fundamental economic issue:
The short-hand description for this [externality problem] is that private costs (or benefits), which do influence a resource owner, are not equivalent to the total of social costs (or benefits) associated with the way an owner uses his resources. An example…concerns the use of soft coal by a steelmaker. The soft coal produces soot. The soot descends on a neighboring laundry, making it more difficult for the laundry to clean its customers' clothes, but this cost is not faced by the owner of the steel mill when he decides to use soft coal to fuel the steelmaking process.
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Perceptions that externalities are ubiquitous have helped produce a generation of largescale governmental intervention in the form of national environmental legislation and related regulations.
The externality issue has also occasioned much re-thinking of fundamental economic principles, particularly in the context of Ronald Coase's celebrated article on "The Problem of Social Cost." 3 As is now well understood, Coase explained that externalities were themselves manifestations of a more fundamental issue in economics, the costs of transacting over rights to undertake actions that affect other people. Low transaction costs allow internalization of social costs, and so reduce the incidence of externalities; as those costs rise, so does the extent of externalities. Coase's analysis of the problem of 1 The term "externality" is used here with full recognition of economists' imprecision as to what constitutes an "externality" in the first place: " [R] igorous definitions of the concept itself are not readily available in the literature." Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371, 371 (1962) . Buchanan and Stubblebine specify a taxonomy by which an "externality" may be technological or pecuniary, marginal or infra-marginal, Pareto-relevant or -irrelevant. For an enlightening discussion, see Haddock, "Irrelevant Internalities, Irrelevant Externalities, and Irrelevant Anxieties" (manuscript). Haddock points out that many phenomena labeled as "externalities" are really related to the production of public-goods. social cost has been so powerful that economists, almost automatically, think of social costs as a problem only when transaction costs are perceived to be relatively high. In the limit, if there were no transaction costs, there seemingly would be no social costs.
Yet , Coasean analysis of externalities has been the subject of much confusion, even disagreeement. Demsetz in particular has recently pointed to aspects of the Coase approach that, as a matter of both economics and of government policy, he finds problematic. As a matter of economics, Demsetz says, Coase's focus on transactions costs is not helpful in resolving questions concerning externalities. Even in a hypothetical world of zero transaction costs, externalities would still exist. Moreover, Demsetz fears, focus on transaction costs as the reason for the persistence of externalities furnishes spurious reasons for undesirable government intervention in markets. Once rights to use a resource are defined, the ultimate use of the resource need not depend on who owns the rights. Although "the delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transactions…the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal decision." 8 Regardless who owns the rights initially, negotiations between owners will move resources to the highest-valued use. Let the right 4 That refuting Pigou was Coase's objective is clear from Coase's definition of "The Problem to Be Examined.," the title of the first section of his 1960 article, and the titles of the final two sections: "The Pigovian Tradition" and "A Change of Approach." Coase notes that the Pigovian model was an "oral tradition," but one embraced by nearly all economists at the time. gotiations between owners will move resources to the highest-valued use. Let the right to clean air belong to the laundry. If the value of emitting smoke exceeds the costs to the laundry, the steelmaker will pay to pollute the laundry. Alternatively, let the steel mill possess the right to pollute the air. Because the value of polluting is worth more to the mill than the costs to the laundry, pollution again will occur. Correspondingly, if the relative cost-benefit magnitudes are reversed -that is, if the cost of pollution to the laundry exceeds the benefits to the mill -there will be no pollution, regardless which firm owns the right to the air.
However, this proposition holds only when there are zero (or trivial) transaction costs. Whether ownership is irrelevant for the ultimate use of resources is "dependent on the assumption of zero transaction costs…That is to say, with zero transaction costs, the value of production would be maximized." 9 But with important transaction costs, resource use may not be optimal. High transaction costs mean that the definition of rights may affect the use to which resources are put. Transaction costs preclude negotiations between the steelmaker and the laundry. Judicial definition of rights to emit or not to emit smoke therefore determines whether the smoke will emitted, regardless of the relative benefits and costs of pollution. Thus, judicial determination of rights may result in economic loss.
Harold Demsetz has recently challenged the the Coase construct concerning externalities. Demsetz raises two objections. He posits that Coase's arguments concerning 9 Coase, Notes, at 158. The construct of zero transaction costs must be understood as applicable in a specific situation only after property rights have been defined. As Cheung points out, the definition of property rights is itself a process necessarily entailing positive transaction costs. 
A. Transaction Costs
Demsetz rejects the centrality of transaction costs to the existence of externality problems. Regardless whether transaction costs are high, low or non-existent, externalities will exist, i.e., resource owners will not take into account the full social costs of their activities.
[W]hat I have to say, because I deny the importance attached by
Coase to transaction cost, allows us to reject the externality problem in cases in which transaction cost is positive as well as those in which it is zero….The elements I stress differ from Coase's, but they also serve to restrict the set of economic activities described as exhibiting policy-relevant externalities.
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Externalities will persist because phenomena other than transaction costs are relevant to solving the problem of social cost. Demsetz focuses in particular on firm ownership and the gains from specialization. If a single firm owns both the steel mill and the laundry, there are by definition no external effects from smoke; all costs are internalized.
However, let the mill and the laundry now be owned separately, reflecting gains from specialization in operating two very different sorts of business. Even if transaction costs are positive, in such a hypothetical Coasean world there still would be no external costs.
The two firms could always merge, and costs that had been external would be internalized. But a merger would result in a conglomerate firm operating both a steel mill would by definition remove all transaction costs, but only at a cost of lost specialization.
In short, even if transaction costs were zero, and firms could costlessly combine to solve externality problems, management costs would arise. Those costs could be prohibitive, leaving the possibility of positive externalities in a zero-transaction-cost world.
"There simply is no reason to proclaim a special role for transaction cost in the externality problem except for the fact that, if we insist on separate ownership, positive transaction cost creates the problem of choosing between two alternative assignments of ownership rights." 17 On the other hand, transaction costs could be positive, yet no externalities would arise as long as the costs of foregone specialization were relatively low.
B. The Political Sub-Text of Externality Problems
15 Demsetz, supra note __, at 290. 16 Demsetz, supra note __, at 287. 17 Demsetz, supra note __, at 296.
For Demsetz, Coasean analysis is problematic also because it gives rise to two unwarranted implications. Both relate to the role of government in a social-cost setting.
First, Demsetz complains that if resources are misallocated when transaction costs are high, that is not a problem of the economic system. It is a judicial or political problem, stemming from courts or legislatures awarding property rights to a lower-valuing user when subsequent negotiations are too costly to move those rights to higher-valued uses. The point, "overlooked by Coase," is that the award of property rights is not germane to a judgment about the efficiency with which the economic system works….[The assignment of rights] lies outside the price system in the legal system….Coase has confused issues by bringing the legal system into his evaluation of Pigou's theory….Why should we claim an externality-associated inefficiency in the operations of the economic system because legal policy has reduced the value of the mix of goods produced?
18
Moreover, when rights are accorded to the wrong owner, economically speaking, the resulting inefficiency in turn furnishes an excuse for government subsequently to step into the marketplace. When private cost does not equal social cost, the "result of this inequality" is the seeming fact that "the state can improve matters through taxes and subsidies that bring private cost into equality with social cost." 19 Again, because the problem really resides in the judicial-legislative system, not the economic system, the claimed desirability of government intervention is fallacious.
III. The Demsetz Critique of Coase
Criticism of a Nobel laureate by another economist of Harold Demsetz' eminence is noteworthy, and invites study. As one undertakes that study, it is worth recalling that, for all its seeming simplicity, the Coase Theorem has been the subject of much debate Rev. 623 (1986) . But from Ellickson's demonstration that people (particularly those in repeat-dealing situations) find ways cheaper than the law to solve their problems, it is difficult to tell whether Ellickson believes his findings support or contradict Coase.
Coase's Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher, like most writing in law and economics, implies that disputants look solely to formal legal rules to determine their entitlements. In rural Shasta County, California, residents instead typically look to informal norms to determine their entitlements in animal trespass situations. In open-range areas, the norm that a livestock owner should supervise his animals dominates the legal rule that a cattleman is not legally liable for unintentional trespasses on unfenced land. Trespass victims mainly employ negative gossip and physical reprisals against trespassing stock to discipline cattlemen who violate this norm.
In Shasta County, the law of trespass had no apparent feedback effects on trespass norms. In no instance did the legal designation of an area as open (or closed) range affect how residents resolved a trespass or estray dispute… [Various] findings suggest the unreality of other literal features of the Coasean Parable. Victims of stray cattle did not treat the formal legal rules as exogenous; they were aware that one way to use limited resources is to lobby for legal change. Victims' enforcement of their norm-based entitlements was far from complete; they ignored some trespasses altogether and used others to offset outstanding informal debts.
All this has led Coase himself to abjure anything called the Coase Theorem, stating that his work advanced a proposition "which has been transformed into the Coase Theorem….I did not originate the phrase, the 'Coase Theorem,' nor its precise formulation, both of which we owe to Stigler." 24 It is submitted here that Demsetz' criticism of Coase is in part unnecessary. It is based, in part, on issues that Coase himself recognized (and sometimes had already discussed earlier), but chose not to discuss in any detail in "The Problem of Social Cost." At the same time, by discussing them more fully, Demsetz adds to one's understanding of Coase.
A. Transaction Costs
In discussing the externality problem, it will be helpful to refer to a series of hypothetical situations, with assumed values describing the smoke externality example. Victims tended to shun monetary settlements and instead preferred in-kind transfers, including ones effected through self-help. Although these findings are at odds with the literal features of the Coasean Parable, they are fully consistent with Coase's central idea that, regardless of the specific content of law, people tend to structure their affairs to their mutual advantage.
The Shasta County evidence suggests that law and economics scholars need to pay more heed to how transaction costs influence the resolution of disputes. … Lawand-economics scholars misdirect their readers and students when they invoke examples --such as the Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher --that greatly exaggerate the domain of human activity upon which the law casts a shadow.
38 Stan. L. Rev. at 685-86 (citations omitted).
That is, the laundry suffers greater loss (11) than the steel mill gains (5) from the mill's smoke emissions. There are net gains (6) from the mill's agreeing not to emit the smoke.
But the transaction costs (8) of attaining this agreed on solution exceed the gains available.
This seems the sort of setting Demsetz has in mind. In this situation, does "ownership rearrangement," that is, unified ownership of the mill and laundry, "essentially undermine the very existence of the externality problem"? Clearly, it does. With ownership unified, the losses from lost specialization (3) By hypothesis, the facts related to the externality itself are unchanged. The respective losses and gains to the laundry and the mill still leave room for a social gain (6) from smoke abatement, but less than the transaction cost (8) of negotiating the abatement.
However, the cost of removing the externality by unifying ownership of the two firms is prohibitive, as indicated by the brackets. The cost (15) exceeds the gains of internalizing the externality (6), meaning that the externality will remain, as long as any solution to the problem depends on private negotiations or rearrangement of ownership.
Focus on ownership does not necessarily mean that one would "reject the externality problem in cases in which transaction cost is positive," as Demsetz claims. True, transactions costs from negotiation between two separate entities could be reduced to zero by unifying ownership. But unification would not be the choice made by value-maximizing firms.
In short, Demsetz is correct that transaction costs are not sufficient for external- costs are not sufficient for an externality to persist. However, they might -at least sometimes -explain a persistent externality. But -and this was Coase's point -they would be problematic only in the event that rights were defined sub-optimally to begin with.
Even as he mentioned the possibility that the emergence of a single firm might solve any relevant externality, Coase did not purport to provide a fully-specified, multivariate model of the externality problem. He referred to his discussion of the social-cost problem when transaction costs are positive as "extremely inadequate." 27 Other margins than unified ownership exist, and could be fit into a schema like that in Hypotheticals A and B, to show other possible ways of resolving externalities. Coase, for example, mentions in passing (though Demsetz does not) ways of avoiding social cost through unilateral self-help. Suppose that the laundry could unilaterally, at a cost of 2, purchase fans to blow away the soot that dirties the clothes it is trying to clean. If that cost (2) is lower than the laundry's share of the total transaction costs (7) of negotiating a solution with the mill and of foregone specialization (3) in the event of unified ownership, it presumably would be the solution adopted.
Other possible solutions might also exist. such as steel and laundry. However, it is not necessary for firms themselves to combine, losing the advantages of specialization, in order to resolve social cost problems. Rather, investors can construct a more complex corporate structure, such as a holding company, in which the steel mill and the laundry are maintained and operated as separate subsidiary firms, each with its own board of directors but subject to direction from a single holdingcompany board, which in turn is elected by a single group of shareholders.
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In other words, unification of firms (with concomitant loss of the gains from specialization in production) is not required to solve externality problems. The gains from specialization may be maintained by operating separate firms, with specialized management and production in each. But adjustment of those firms' activities causing external-28 Although Demsetz does not specify the organization of the firms he is talking about in discussing foregone specialization, he seems to have in mind a "unitary firm," one in which the producer and owner are one. See McNulty, On the Nature and Theory of Economic Organization: The Role of the Firm Reconsidered, 16 Hist. Pol. Econ. 233 (1984) .
ities so as to increase overall (holding) firm value would come from the unified board of directors and unified group of investors.
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The holding-company structure alleviates any loss in the gains from specialization in production between firms. But what of lost specialization within a firm? Firms, of course, are not economic actors; it is the investors and managers of the modern firm who undertake the tasks necessary for the firm to earn profits. In the modern corporation, those tasks -investing and managing -are typically separate. By the "separation of ownership from control," specialization allows those with capital to invest without having to manage, and those with management abilities to use them without having to invest. A single board now must learn about the costs to one firm (the laundry) inflicted by another firm (the mill), and decide what to do, increasing the amount of information required as compared to the situation when ownership is not unified. Management costs seemingly have increased.
In fact, the possibility of specialization within firms suggests that there are no necessary increases in management costs when externalities are internalized via rearrangement of ownership into a unified firm. In the Coasean model, there are two firms with two separate boards. In a setting with zero transaction costs, each board will need to learn what the costs (to the laundry) or benefits (for the mill) from pollution are, so as to 29 The point is similar to that concerning diversification of risk in stock markets. Diversification of course can reduce risk. But does that mean that there is value to be had by merging the two firms, thus combining their returns? Ordinarily, there is no gain to be had by merging the two firms because investors can diversify their portfolios to obtain the same gains in reducing risk .
Diversification is undoubtedly a good thing, but that does not mean that firms should practice it. If investors were not able to hold a large number of securities, then they might want firms to diversify for them. But investors can diversify. In many ways they can do so more easily than firms. Individuals can invest in the steel industry this week and pull out next week. A firm cannot do that. In short, what Demsetz refers to as "management costs" are just internal transaction costs. 30 Negotiations between separate firms -the mill and the laundry -can be replaced by negotiations between the mill and laundry subsidiaries of a single holdingcompany firm. Whichever name is used, "transaction costs" or "management costs," the only question is which is cheaper, negotiations in the market or within the firm -the very 30 Likewise, what Demsetz calls "unified ownership" is a term that applies as well to the Coasean bargaining solution. The two parties are negotiating over ownership of the right to pollute (the steel mill) or to be compensated for any pollution (the laundry). The negotiation creates unified ownership of a property right. where there are institutions, or in a "society" in the plain sense of the term. But changing household terminology is nearly impossible, so "transaction costs" stays even though it is not strictly correct and may even be misleading.
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Elusiveness of the term "transaction costs" doubtless explains the alternative evaluations of the Coase Theorem as "profound, trivial, a tautology, false, revolutionary, [or] wicked." But defined as all costs arising from interactions among two or more economic actors, "transaction costs" per Coase include the "management costs" that Demsetz discusses (and which Coase himself had already discussed in "The Nature of the Firm"). 31 The analysis here could be extended to other sorts of cost, such as that of information. If, institutionally, the firm is now a holding company with the mill and laundry as subsidiaries, shareholders and management will still have to invest in learning the relative costs and benefits of smoke emissions by the mill. But there would seem no necessary increase in overall management costs. The sole difference would be that both the mill and the laundry were represented in the decision about smoke emissions by a group (shareholders and their management) bent on joint maximization rather than by separate managements bent on maximizing what was good for them individually. But two sets of information/valuation costs would be incurred, regardless.
32 Cheung, supra note __, at 515.
C. Government and Externalities
There is potentially a third solution to the problem of social cost: government, if and when the cost of a government solution to the social cost problem is acceptably low.
Suppose that the prior cost accounting were augmented to include the cost of a government solution, as follows: 
Cost of Government Solution: 4
The private-ownership solution is not cost-effective (as again indicated by the brackets).
However, there is a government solution available at a cost (4) that is lower than the private solution, lower than the private transaction costs between the mill and the laundry, and lower than the social gain (6) achievable by the hypothesized government solution.
Coase raises this possibility.
An alternative solution is direct governmental regulation. Instead of instituting a legal system of rights which can be modified by transaction on the market, the government may impose regulations which state what people must or must not do and which have to be obeyed….It is clear that the government has powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost than could a private organization….
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As noted above, Demsetz finds objectionable the role of government in the Coase model, for two reasons.
Economic vs. Political Failures
The possible importance of government in the Coasean model begins when it defines rights sub-optimally in a world of positive transactions costs that make private contracting unfeasible. As noted earlier, in discussing sub-optimal property rights, Coase typically refers to judicial definition of rights. Demsetz objects to claims of economic inefficiency when courts define rights sub-optimally, claiming that this is a governmental (judicial, legislative) problem, not an economic one. Coase, he says, "has confused issues by bringing the legal system's problems into his evaluation of Pigou's theory."
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But Coase would hardly disagree on this distinction between politics and economics. As he put it, Judges have to decide on legal liability, but this should not confuse economists about the nature of the economic problem involved….
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem strange to an economist, because many of the factors on which the decision turns are, to an economist, irrelevant. Because of this, situations which are, from an economic point of view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts. The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximize the value of production.
35
It is difficult to see any difference in this respect between Coase and Demsetz. 35 Coase, Social Cost, at 112, 114. 36 It is likewise unclear to what, empirically, Demsetz objects to when he writes of Coase's "bringing the legal system's problems into his evaluation of Pigou's theory." Coase states repeatedly that he believes the legal system usually discerns correctly the higher-valued use for a resource when its ownership is disputed. E.g., Coase, Social Cost, at 120 ("the courts have often recognized the economic implications of their decisions are are aware [as many economists are not]of the reciprocal nature of the problem"); at 123-34 ("it seems probable that in the interpretation of words and phrases like 'reasonable' or 'common or ordinary use' there is some recognition, perhaps unconscious and certainly not very explicit, of the economic aspects of the question at issue"); at 133 (courts "often make, although not always in a very explicit fashion, a However, there is an important ambiguity in the externality literature that the Demsetz critique of Coase illuminates. What does "government intervention" mean?
Coase was plainly concerned about intervention that actually weakened well-established, existing property rights, referring to "special regulations (whether embodied in a statute or brought about as a result of rulings of an administrative agency). Such regulations state what people must or must not do." But some aspects of "government" define property rights, often at lower cost than is possible in a private ordering of affairs. 37 Other parts of government, notably courts, enforce property rights. Newman, ed. 1998) . 41 The fact that judicial resolution is financed by taxpayers may make this choice artificially inexpensive, but this is not Demsetz's quarrel with government definition of property rights.
regulation are likely to be more costly than ownership rearrangements. The externality issue, he indicates, "lies at the core of many problems of concern to environmentalists," 42 and by now the political side of "environmentalism" is well understood. , vol. II 465 (P. Newman, ed. 1998). in which case therefore the costs of handling the problem through market or the firm may be high." 47 Earlier, he had accorded more space to this same point, stating that if "many people are harmed" by pollution, "the market may become too costly to operate."
In these circumstances it may be preferable to impose special regulations (whether embodied in a statute or brought about as a result of rulings of an administrative agency). Such regulations state what people must or must not do. When this is done, the law directly determines the location of economic activities, methods of production, and so on. Thus the problem of smoke pollution may be dealt with by regulations which specify the kind of heating and power equipment which can be used in houses and factories or which confine manufacturing establishments to certain districts by zoning arrangements.
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But this is just a restatement of the transaction cost issue illustrated in Hypothetical C.
As with everything else, the issue is empirical and situation-specific; no categorical claims can be made. 50 He is careful to note that often the best solution to a "problem" of social cost is to do nothing. "It will no doubt be commonly the case that the gain which would come from regulating the actions which give rise to the harmful effects will be less than the costs involved in governmental regulation." 51 But, as in Hypothetical C above, the possibility remains that government intervention will prove beneficial because of high private transaction costs among externality victims.
Further, Coase refers to government solutions only in cases where the number of victims is large:
there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people is involved and when therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.
transaction costs -will be large. In the large-number case, that is, the distinction blurs between Demsetzian lost-specialization costs and Coasean transaction costs.
Certainly, no one can accuse Coase of blind adoption of government solutions to the problem of social cost. Government intervention, he wrote, can be "extremely costly," being subject to "political pressures and operating without any competitive check." 53 Coase suspects that the relative cost conditions in Hypothetical C will not of- intervention if a better resolution of the problem is found by having a market separate the two activities? The implicit but important un-stated (and un-defendable) assumption that must be recognized to rationalize the Coase view is that the State can do a better job of substituting for markets than it can do by substituting for management.
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If intervention to solve management-cost issues seems patently unjustified to most, why does the efficiency of intervention to solve transaction cost problems strike many as justfied?
IV. Conclusion
In the ongoing debate over externalities, Harold Demsetz objects to Coase's failure to appreciate the importance of specialization in production as a reason, separate from transaction costs, that externalities might exist. But a re-reading of Coase reveals his awareness of the possible importance of unified ownership in resolving the problem of social cost. Nonetheless, Demsetz treatment of specialization and ownership goes further into those aspects of the problem, and thus is a useful addition to the social cost literature.
In particular, it elicits further thinking about other margins along which solutions to the problem of social cost might lie. Demsetz' own solutions, though, seem to be firm- 
